Inference on the Network Evolution in BitTorrent Mainline DHT by Wang, Liang & Kangasharju, Jussi
Inference on the Network Evolution in
BitTorrent Mainline DHT
Liang Wang and Jussi Kangasharju
Department of Computer Science, University of Helsinki, Finland
Abstract. Network size is a fundamental statistic for a peer-to-peer
system but is generally considered to contain too little information to be
useful. However, most existing work only considers the metric by itself
and does not explore what features could be extracted from this seem-
ingly trivial metric. In this paper, we show that Fourier transform allows
us to extract frequency features from such time series data, which can
further be used to characterize user behaviors and detect system anoma-
lies in a peer-to-peer system automatically without needing to resort to
visual comparisons. By using the proposed algorithm, our system suc-
cessfully discovers and clusters countries of similar user behavior and
captures the anomalies like Sybil attacks and other real-world events
with high accuracy. Our work in this paper highlights the usefulness of
more advanced time series processing techniques in analyzing network
measurements.
Keywords: BitTorrent Mainline DHT, User behavior characterization,
anomaly detection, Fourier transform, Feature extraction, Classification
1 Introduction
Measuring the properties of a system can not only report various system statis-
tics, but can also be used to expose underlying relationships between general
system dynamics and other characteristics. This, however, requires that the mea-
surements capture the essential characteristics or that appropriate processing is
done to the measurements to enable extraction of useful features. In many ex-
isting measurement work, measured data is simply reported as-is, which makes
obtaining deeper insight from the measurements difficult. While such “naive”
results hold some interest in themselves, more advanced methods yield more
insight and enable automatic comparison of many interesting features.
System measurement has its irreplaceable importance in the Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) research. The purpose of the measurements is not merely meant to re-
port the system statistics but also expected to expose the underlying relations
between the system dynamics and other characteristics. However, such insight
from the statistics can only be obtained given the data is properly processed, in
other words, when the useful information is extracted. E.g. the network size is
a fundamental statistic for a P2P system, and network evolution data describes
how the size changes as a function of time. However, network size as a system
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2metric is generally considered containing too little information to be useful. On
the contrary, the fact is network evolution data contains much more useful and
interesting information than most people expect. As we will show in this paper,
such information can help us finding similar use patterns of different countries
and even detecting system anomalies.
In this paper we use Fourier transform to extract representative features from
a time series of measurements of the size of BitTorrent MLDHT network. Fourier
transform is not sensitive to issues like temporal alignment of different samples
and it provides us with an easy way of obtaining a “fingerprint” of the data
sample. We apply this technique to measurements in different ways and show
how it can be used to identify many relevant features of the network. Fourier
transforms are a well-known and widely-used technique in other fields, but they
have not so far been much used in network measurement work.
Specifically, our contributions are as follows:
1. We use Fourier transforms to extract frequency-based features from network
evolution data. The simple algorithm is also applicable to other time series
data in P2P measurements.
2. We show the frequency-based features are robust to the noisy data and
can be used to characterize user behaviors and detect system anomalies.
Our method indicates the data sets with simple structure may contain more
information than we have expected.
3. We implement our algorithm and evaluate it on a realistic monitoring system.
We report its actual performance along with some interesting findings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief intro-
duction on Fourier transform and related work. Section 3 presents our method
of extracting frequency-based features and Section 4 evaluates it on the realistic
system. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Background on Fourier Transform
The original idea of Fourier transform is to decompose a function1 into a summa-
tion of a series of sinusoids waves, or in other words, projecting a function from
one function base to another. Often, a discretized form consisting only of T con-
secutive sampling points is used which leads to the discrete Fourier transform.
In complex form, it can be written as follows:
f [t] =
T−1∑
k=0
f̂ [k]ej2pikt/T t ∈ {0, 1, 2...T − 1} (1)
f̂ [k] =
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
f [t]e−j2pikt/T k ∈ {0, 1, 2...T − 1} (2)
1 In this paper, we use function, signal and time series interchangeably as long as it
does not cause ambiguity in the context.
3where j is the imaginary unit and f̂ [k] denotes the Fourier coefficient of
frequency k in the complex form. Fourier transform in the complex plane is much
simpler than the trigonometric form and can be efficiently calculated using Fast
Fourier Transform (FFT). For a more thorough overview of Fourier transform
and related techniques, please refer to [1, 2].
Despite of its wide application in many fields, Fourier transforms (or other
similar methods) have not been commonly used in peer-to-peer research even
though a lot of research has focused on collecting data [3–9]. The same is largely
true of many other network measurement research. Though in many existing
works, the focus is on different aspects of the system ranging from security and
topology to economic incentives, the general methodology is in many cases simi-
lar in the sense that the goal is to find a pattern by extracting as much informa-
tion as possible from time series data. For this kind of work, Fourier transforms
and other mechanisms, such as wavelets, can provide interesting insight. In this
paper we show that using Fourier transforms, we are able to extract meaningful
insight from a simple time series of network size evolution data. Past works that
have looked at this kind of data typically have been limited to describing quanti-
tative numbers about the size evolution or usage in different countries. Our work
shows that we can classify different countries according to their usage behavior
and easily visualize how different countries group together. Naturally, more so-
phisticated methods, such as wavelets, could also be used and would likely yield
additional insights; our goal in this paper is to highlight the benefits of using
proper time series analysis techniques and open the road for further research.
3 Frequency-Based Feature
To compare user behavior and detect behavior changes, as well as to capture
anomalies, we first need to identify a robust feature set. As mentioned, we apply
Fourier transform to country-level network size evolution and then generate a
frequency-based feature set as its unique “fingerprint”. In this section, we for-
mulate the relevant definitions and detail the actual steps of feature extraction
from network size evolution. Then we show how the similarities derived can
be used to discover patterns and detect anomalies. Fig. 1 depicts the general
workflow of the proposed method. Starting from the raw time series data, i.e.,
estimated number of users in a country or the whole system, we perform the
Fourier transform to obtain the frequency domain features. Using singular value
decomposition, we reduce the dimensionality of the feature vector to allow for
easier comparison of different samples. Below we will detail these steps.
3.1 Feature Extraction with FFT
Our data sets are collected from a monitoring system similar to the one in [3],
which continuously estimates the network size of MLDHT by crawling its ID
space. Each crawl generates a full list of IP addresses in a subspace. Using the
methodology presented in [3], we can get a good estimate of the total network
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Fig. 1: The general workflow from feature extraction to user behavior character-
ization and anomaly detection.
size. System-level network evolution can be obtained by a series of such mea-
surements, then further decomposed to country-level (even city-level) evolution
based on their IP blocks. We use the MaxMind service2 to perform the mapping
of IP addresses to geographical locations.
Definition 1 Network evolution of a specific country c is a time series fc(t)
which gives the network size of c at time t.
For simplicity of notation, we drop the subscript c if it causes no confusion in
the context. Our actual measurements show that f(t) is practically a stationary
function with a period of one week for almost all the countries, because user
behavior is generally different in the weekends than weekdays, but similar from
one week to another. So in our calculation, we adopt a period window of seven
consecutive days (irrelevant of the starting point) which consists of T discretized
sampling points f [0], f [1], f [2] ... f [T − 1]. Fourier transform of this time series
gives another complex vector of the same length which we will use as the starting
point of the frequency-based feature set.
Definition 2 Frequency-based feature set F of a specific network evolution se-
ries f(t) is a real vector where element k represents the normalized Fourier
coefficient associated with frequency k in f(t).
Specifically,
F [k] =
f̂ [k]
‖ f̂ ‖
=
1
T ‖ f̂ ‖
∣∣∣∣∣
T−1∑
t=0
f [k]e−j2pikt/T
∣∣∣∣∣ (3)
2 www.maxmind.com
5where the normalizer ‖ f̂ ‖ equals
‖ f̂ ‖= 1
T
√√√√T−1∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣∣
T−1∑
t=0
f [k]e−j2pikt/T
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(4)
‖ · ‖ above denotes Euclidean norm. E.q.(3) is simply the Fourier coefficient
of frequency k normalized by ‖ f̂ ‖. E.q.(4) calculates the length of the raw
coefficient vector in T -dimensional space which is used as an normalizer in (3).
The purpose of normalization is to filter out the effect from the absolute network
size but focusing on the pure pattern of a curve. Essentially, we are using a
normalized vector of Fourier coefficients as the feature set, where each element
represents the amplitude of its associated frequency component in the original
signal f(t).
High dimensional features are usually noisy, redundant and expensive to com-
pare. Common technique for dimensionality reduction is Singular Value Decom-
position (SVD). Fig. 2a shows the semi-log plot of the singular values in a feature
set. We can see the first two components dominate the system dynamics. More
precisely, the first principal component itself captures over 77% of the energy. In
practice, we only keep the first 40 principal components (denoted by u) in order
to retain 99.20% of the system energy. The refined feature set can be calculated
with u as follows, and k = 40 in our case.
F ∗ = [u0, u1, u2...uk−1]′F (5)
The actual computation can be done efficiently since FFT and SVD are stan-
dard routines in scientific computing libraries. Once the feature set is successfully
extracted, we can use it to characterize user behavior and further look for similar
patterns with properly defined similarity metric as follows.
Definition 3 Similarity Sa,b of two feature sets F
∗
a and F
∗
b is defined as their
Euclidean distance in k-dimensional space.
Sa,b =‖ F ∗a − F ∗b ‖ (6)
The code in Algorithm 1 shows how the features are actually extracted and
pairwise similarity is calculated. The key input M is a matrix where each column
vector represents a country’s network evolution of a 7-day window. The column
vector contains 2048 discretized sampling points. k is the number of principal
components we want to keep in the final feature set. The rest of the code is easy
to understand. Lines 4 - 8 iterate all the countries, where line 5 calculates the
Fourier coefficients using FFT, and line 6 normalizes it to a real unit vector.
Note that in our case abs function translates each complex element in z into
corresponding amplitude. Lines 9 and 10 reduce the feature set dimensionality
by taking the first k principal components. Function pdist in line 11 calculates
the pairwise distance for a given point set. Eventually, each column in the output
matrix F represents a k-dimensional feature set of a country, and S contains their
pairwise similarity metrics.
6Algorithm 1 Feature extraction and pairwise similarity
1: Input: Network evolution matrix M , k first components
2: Output: Feature matrix F , similarity matrix S
3: [h, w] = size(M)
4: for i = 1 : w do
5: z = fft(M(::, i))
6: z = abs(z) / sqrt(z′ ∗ z)
7: F = [F z]
8: end for
9: [ u, s, v ] = svd(F )
10: F = u(:, 1 : k)′ ∗ F
11: S = pdist(F ′, ’euclidean’)
3.2 Anomaly Detection Based on Fluctuation
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(a) Semi-log plot of the principal
components in the feature set. The
first two dominate the dynamics.
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Fig. 2: Feature set is dominated by only few components, and is rather stable
during the system normal operations.
In a broad sense, a system anomaly indicates a significant change in a certain
system metric which is usually reflected as fluctuation or drift in the correspond-
ing time series. Such anomalies might be due to service breakdowns, system at-
tacks, or drastic changes in use pattern. Detecting such anomalies with satisfying
sensitivity and fall-out rate is generally difficult, especially with noisy data.
For an ideal stationary periodic signal, the feature set is time-invariant and
remains constant since it has been projected to the frequency domain. Even
in a practical setting where some noise is inevitable, the feature set does not
vary much if the overall evolution remains constant. In other words, the feature
7(a) Similarity is extracted from simple network evolution series.
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Fig. 3: Clustering of countries based on the similar use patterns, and the original
network evolution of some selected countries.
set in each measurement should only fluctuate around its mean and at a very
small scale. Fig. 2b plots the variation of system-level features with the mean
subtracted from the values. The lower figure shows that the feature distribution
during normal operations is very narrow and Gaussian-like. In the upper figure,
8we can see all the corresponding blue points scattered around the origin within
a very small area. The big red cross in the top-right corner marks the deviant
feature measured when a Sybil attack was launch in September 2011 [10]. We
can see it deviates very far away from the center and this deviation can be used
as an indicator of an anomaly. Note that this only indicates a possible anomaly
but does not (necessarily) yield information about the nature of the anomaly.
Therefore, we can take advantage of the stability of the frequency-based
feature and use it as an anomaly indicator. Technically, it is done by reusing the
similarity metric introduced in Section 3.1 against a signal itself, namely Sa,a¯.
Definition 4 Anomaly indicator for an entity a is defined as Sa,a¯ =‖ Fa−µa ‖,
where Fa and µa denote the current measurement on F
∗
a and its average value
respectively.
By definition Sa,a¯ is the deviation of the current measured F
∗
a to its own
average. In other words, it measures how similar a signal to itself on average in
each measurement. In practice, sample mean is used in place of the true average.
An alarm can be triggered if the deviation is large enough, e.g., Sa,a¯ > 3σa and
σ2a denotes the variance of F
∗
a . In the actual implementation, we incorporate su-
pervised machine learning technique to achieve good balance between sensitivity
and fall-out rate.
4 Evaluation in the Wild
In the following, we briefly report the performance of the proposed method
on a realistic monitoring system with some selected results. We evaluate our
method in terms of its effectiveness of clustering similar user behaviors and the
accuracy of capturing anomalies. We extended the basic system proposed in [3]
by incorporating the feature extraction and anomaly detection modules, and
reimplemented it on Spark. The system is not only able to quickly respond to
the continuous real-time samples, but also capable of fast processing terabytes
historical archives.
4.1 Discover Similarity in Use Patterns
The evolution of network size represents how and when the system is accessed
and used, which further reflects the characteristics of the use patterns from a
group of geographically-close users. The frequency-based feature is expected to
capture the similarity in such patterns and reflect in the proposed similarity
metric defined in Section 3.1.
To gain an intuitive understanding of the effectiveness of such mechanisms,
we use the first two principal components in the feature set and plot them in
Fig.3a. Countries are marked with different colors according to their geographical
regions, and their coordinates in the figure are determined by the two principal
components. At the first glance, most of the countries gather together roughly
9based on their geographical proximity. This is understandable since the geo-
graphical closeness usually indicates that the countries share social, cultural,
and economic bonds which lead to similar user behavior. For example, among
the European countries, most East European countries stay at the right of the
figure while the most Western ones gather in the middle.
However, we can see some interesting phenomena among some sets of coun-
tries. Comparing Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, we see that Korea is mapped to a
very different place in Figure 3a and if we compare the actual daily patterns of
these three countries, as shown in Figure 3b, we see that the Korean pattern is
clearly different from that of Japan or Taiwan. Similar observation holds when
comparing Korea with Singapore or Hong Kong which map close to Japan and
Taiwan in Figure 3a. Likewise, Figure 3c compares USA, Canada, and Russia,
and the visual differences in the patterns are also reflected in the placement of
the three countries in Figure 3a. (USA and Canada are towards the left, Russia
is in the middle.)
We have compared other groupings of countries and have seen that countries
that map close to each other in Figure 3a have visually similar daily patterns.
However, data in Figure 3a only serves to classify countries into different group-
ings. The distances between different countries do not really serve as an indicator
of how different their daily patterns are; instead it only indicates the existence
of a difference.
4.2 Detecting Nontrivial Anomalies with Learning
Despite different potential causes, the system anomalies are reflected as statis-
tically significant changes in the feature by definition. Anomaly detection takes
advantage of the stability of frequency-based features, and issues an alarm when
the deviation is large enough. As we have introduced in Section 3.2, the thresh-
old of triggering an alarm can either be manually set or automatically learnt
from labelled data. The blue solid line in the Fig. 4a shows the performance by
simply varying variance-based threshold in the ROC space. Recall that ROC
curve shows the trade-off between sensitivity (true positive rate) and fall-out
(false positive rate) in a classification system and increasing the threshold im-
proves fall-out by sacrificing sensitivity. The red dashed line in Fig. 4a represents
a pure guess, which serves as a baseline that any rational algorithm should be
above and the top-left corner represents perfect accuracy. Our evaluation shows
that simple variance-based threshold can already achieve good accuracy. In the
actual system, we adopted an naive Bayesian classifier trained on a data set of
500 labelled anomalies, and its accuracy is plotted as a black cross in the same
Fig. 4a. As we can see, frequency-based feature with basic supervised learning
leads to a high-accuracy detection module.
Besides the large-scale Sybil attack mentioned in Section 3.2 and many oth-
ers, our anomaly detection system also successfully captured a lot of interest-
ing real-world events. For example, there was a severe earthquake happened in
To¯hoku, Japan on March 11th, 2011. Figure 4b shows the network evolution of
the corresponding week. Our feature extraction method would have indicated an
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alarm due to the large-scale network breakdown which caused tens of thousands
of computers disconnected from the network. While Figure 4b illustrates the
impacts from natural causes, Figure 4c on the right shows how the social and
cultural events can change user behaviors. Figure 4c plots the Christmas week
in 2013 with green lines for Canada, Japan, and Russia (from top to bottom).
To highlight the pattern drift, the network evolution of a normal week is also
plotted in the same figure with blue line. Interestingly, we notice while there
was significant drop in the network size during Christmas in Canada (actually
in most western countries), this number increased quite a lot in Japan (also in
many other Asian countries). Russia, on the other hand, did not change much
during this time period. One possible explanation could be that in Russia Christ-
mas is celebrated according to the Orthodox calendar, meaning that it falls a
few weeks later than in Western countries; in other words, the week shown in
Figure 4c is simply a normal week compared with another normal week.
4.3 Summary
As the results above show, the features extracted via Fourier transform allow us
to look at the data from another point of view and observe different phenomena
more easily. For example, characterizing the diurnal patterns in different coun-
tries is readily visible in Figure 3 without the need to compare every country
pairs visually.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that Fourier transform can be used as a simple yet
powerful tool to extract representative information from time series data in P2P
measurements. Applying Fourier transform on network size evolution data, we
showed that this seemingly trivial statistic contains rich information. The ex-
tracted frequency-based feature can be effectively used to characterize user be-
haviors and detect system anomalies. We implemented a monitoring system with
the proposed algorithm and evaluated its actual performance in the realistic en-
vironment with many interesting real-world findings. Our algorithm successfully
discovered nontrivial use patterns and captured anomalies with high accuracy.
In the future, we plan to apply this technique on a broader range of data sets and
also explore its other potential applications in P2P monitor and measurement
research.
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Appendix
BR CA CN EG FI GB HK IL IN IT JP KR NL PL RU SE US
BR 0.00 8.92 6.00 5.56 4.23 5.16 6.46 9.10 4.46 1.81 7.34 3.61 3.02 1.09 1.69 3.95 9.31
CA 8.92 0.00 2.95 3.39 4.69 3.77 2.59 0.19 4.48 7.16 1.72 5.78 5.92 8.22 7.33 4.97 0.39
CN 6.00 2.95 0.00 0.44 1.78 0.85 1.13 3.13 1.54 4.28 1.64 2.88 3.06 5.37 4.47 2.09 3.34
EG 5.56 3.39 0.44 0.00 1.35 0.42 1.35 3.56 1.10 3.84 2.00 2.48 2.63 4.94 4.03 1.67 3.78
FI 4.23 4.69 1.78 1.35 0.00 0.94 2.31 4.87 0.31 2.49 3.16 1.65 1.28 3.59 2.68 0.34 5.08
GB 5.16 3.77 0.85 0.42 0.94 0.00 1.53 3.94 0.71 3.43 2.30 2.22 2.21 4.52 3.62 1.25 4.15
HK 6.46 2.59 1.13 1.35 2.31 1.53 0.00 2.79 2.19 4.66 0.90 3.75 3.44 5.68 4.82 2.53 2.97
IL 9.10 0.19 3.13 3.56 4.87 3.94 2.79 0.00 4.66 7.35 1.91 5.94 6.11 8.41 7.52 5.16 0.22
IN 4.46 4.48 1.54 1.10 0.31 0.71 2.19 4.66 0.00 2.75 3.00 1.62 1.56 3.86 2.95 0.65 4.87
IT 1.81 7.16 4.28 3.84 2.49 3.43 4.66 7.35 2.75 0.00 5.55 2.36 1.24 1.12 0.22 2.19 7.55
JP 7.34 1.72 1.64 2.00 3.16 2.30 0.90 1.91 3.00 5.55 0.00 4.48 4.32 6.58 5.71 3.40 2.08
KR 3.61 5.78 2.88 2.48 1.65 2.22 3.75 5.94 1.62 2.36 4.48 0.00 1.77 3.40 2.58 1.68 6.16
NL 3.02 5.92 3.06 2.63 1.28 2.21 3.44 6.11 1.56 1.24 4.32 1.77 0.00 2.31 1.41 0.96 6.31
PL 1.09 8.22 5.37 4.94 3.59 4.52 5.68 8.41 3.86 1.12 6.58 3.40 2.31 0.00 0.91 3.27 8.60
RU 1.69 7.33 4.47 4.03 2.68 3.62 4.82 7.52 2.95 0.22 5.71 2.58 1.41 0.91 0.00 2.37 7.72
SE 3.95 4.97 2.09 1.67 0.34 1.25 2.53 5.16 0.65 2.19 3.40 1.68 0.96 3.27 2.37 0.00 5.36
US 9.31 0.39 3.34 3.78 5.08 4.15 2.97 0.22 4.87 7.55 2.08 6.16 6.31 8.60 7.72 5.36 0.00
Table 1: The number in the table is a numerical presentation of Fig.3a, which
shows the Euclidean distance of any two selected countries. Small distance indi-
cates there is a high degree of similarity between the two countries.
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Fig. 4: Accuracy of anomaly detection with different threshold tuning techniques,
and some captured real-world events.
